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subsequent statute has declared that some other construction is to
be adopted or has altered the previous statute."
It was found here as a question of fact that rapeseed would not
have been considered a grain in 1897 in Canada. Whether it is a
"grain" today is another matter.
This was largely an academic question because the statute has
been revised since the commencement of this action and rapeseed
is specifically listed as a grain to receive rail reductions under the
Act. R.J.H.

J. PAPER
Footv. Rawlings, [1963] S.C.R. 197.
In Foot v. Rawlings1 the court considered a case the facts of
which promised a discussion of the whole doctrine of consideration.
There, six promissory notes were sued upon. Four of these had
been made in 1952 and were payable on demand with interest at 8%.
The fifth made in 1956 was payable on May 1, 1957. The sixth was
payable on December 10, 1958, with interest at 6 %.
In a written agreement dated July 7, 1958, the plaintiff, payee
of the six notes, agreed to accept the sum of $300 per month provided
it was paid on the 16th of every month until the debt secured by
the first five notes was paid. Interest was reduced to 51%. The parties
agreed orally that payment of the sixth note should be postponed until
the terms of this agreement had been carried out.
According to the terms of the written agreement the defendant
was to give the plaintiff a series of six post-dated cheques from
time to time, each series to cover a period of six months. Should any of
the cheques be turned down by the bank the interest on the unpaid
indebtedness was to revert to 8% and the monthly payments would
revert to $400 per month.
The cheques for the period from July to December 1960 were
dated on the 18th instead of the 16th, apparently through inadvertence. The plaintiff acknowledged receipt of these cheques and later
cashed five of them. The trial judge held that there had been a
default under the written agreement and directed that the plaintiff
recover the full amount of principal and interest outstanding on the
six promissory notes.
The Court of Appeal for British Columbia dismissed an appea 2
from this judgment. A majority of that court held that there was no
consideration for the agreement to forbear and alternatively, if there
was consideration, the defendant would be limited to a cross-action
for breach of the agreement. Davey, J.A. dissenting, said that the
1 [19631 S.C.R. 197.
2 (1962) 37 W.W.R. 289; 32 D.L.R. (2d) 320.
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principle in Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House
Ltd.3 was applicable and the plaintiff was estopped from enforcing his
legal rights.
In the Supreme Court of Canada Cartwright J. delivered the
judgment of the court and, allowing the appeal, set aside the judgment
of the Court of Appeal and directed that judgment be entered dismissing the action with costs throughout.
Dealing first with the contention that there had been a default
under the written agreement, His Lordship said:
It may be that [the plaintiff]
could have elected ... to rescind the agree4
ment but he did not do so.

Having decided that there had been no default at the time the
writ was issued on December 7, 1960, Cartwright J. went on to consider whether the action was thus premature. Without finding it
necessary to consider the question of promissory estoppel His Lordship concluded that:
...the giving of the several series of post-dated cheques constituted
good consideration for the agreement by [the plaintiff] to forbear from
taking action on the promissory notes so long as [the defendant]
continued to deliver
the cheques and the same were paid by the bank
on presentation. 5

This conclusion was based on the decision of the Court of Exchequer
in the case of Sibree v. Tripp6 and on its acceptance by the House of
7
Lords in Foakes v. Beer.
Sibree v. Tripp had extended the rule in Pinnel's Cases to the
situation where a debt was satisfied by the giving of a negotiable
instrument for a lesser amount. It should be noted, however, that
the case was one of accord and satisfaction and it is not clear that
the present case would fall into that classification solely because of the
promise to forbear. Nevertheless, Cartwright J. did not consider it
necessary to demonstrate the validity of the promise to accept a lesser
rate of interest before applying the Sibree decision.
Although His Lordship stated that the inclusion in the agreement of a privilege of prepayment does not affect the question, he
did not discuss the implications of the provision that should there be
default, payments would revert to $400 per month and interest to
8%. This clause is evidence of an earlier agreement, providing for a
method of extinguishing by degrees a debt largely payable on demand.
I submit it is not clear that if this earlier agreement was invalid
the written agreement would stand in spite of its incorporation.
3 [1947]

K.B. 130.
1 at p. 201.
5 Ibid., at p. 202.
6 (1846) 15 M. & W. 23; 15 L.J. Ex. 318.
7 (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605.
8 (1602) 5 Co. Rep. 117a.
4 Supra footnote
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His Lordship rejected the argument that the written agreement,
if valid, does not create a defence but only renders the plaintiff liable
to damages for not withholding action as agreed. Although the plaintiff's right of action on the six promissory notes has not been extinguished, to allow the argument "would be to countenance the
circuity of action and multiplicity of proceedings which it was one
of the chief objects of the Judicature Acts to abolish and would be
contrary to the terms of subsection 7 of section 2 of the Laws
Declaratory Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 213." 9 While this is extremely
persuasive language it is at least interesting that the practical effect
of the Court's decision is to specifically enforce a promise in a situation in which its counterpart could not be so enforced nor even sued
upon for more than nominal damages since the breach thereof would
result in a financial benefit to the plaintiff. The case of Stracy v.
0
upon which
The Governor and Company of the Bank of England,1
His Lordship relied, was substantially different in this respect.
While the result in Foot v. Rawlings will probably not leave many
with a sense of injustice, it is disappointing that the highest court in
the land did not seize the opportunity to illuminate some difficult
conceptual issues. F.E.A.

Mazur v. ImperialInvestment CorporationLimited, [1963] S.C.R. 281.
The issue with which the Supreme Court of Canada was faced
in this case had not been previously dealt with by a Canadian court.
The Court split three to two in affirming the decision of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court of Alberta and the trial judge Riley
J. in finding for the plaintiff.
K wishing to raise money on a truck he owned, went to S, the
manager of a car sales agency. S made arrangements to have money
advanced by the plaintiff company to the defendant M, a friend of
K's, on a purported conditional sale. The transaction was as follows:
S was to transfer K's truck to M; M would sign a promissory note
and a conditional sale contract. The contract would be assigned
to the plaintiff company and the note discounted with the plaintiff
company by S. The proceeds thereof were to be paid by S to K and
K was to make all the periodic payments. In fact, K never transferred
the truck to S and the whole scheme was merely a device to raise
money. The net amout to be raised was discussed and understood to
be $10,000.
M. signed the conditional sale contract and the promissory
note in blank and transferred them to S who in turn negotiated them
to the plaintiff company for value. The plaintiff in fact filled in the
9Supra footnote 1 at p. 205.
10 (1830) 6 Bing. 754; 8 L.J. O.S.C.P. 234.

